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Cognition can be distributed, extended, enacted, embodied and systemic (but does it matter which?) 
 
The emergence of cognitive psychology as a discipline largely coincided with the adoption of the 
computer metaphor for the mind that casts cognition as a computational process. From this perspective, 
thinking is understood in terms of information processing that takes place solely in the brain. To propose 
that thinking could be extended beyond the boundaries of the brain was, for many, a radical and even 
ridiculous approach. However, the notion of thinking being extended beyond the physical confines of the 
brain is to date seen as less radical and often described under various labels, namely that cognition is 
distributed (Hutchins, 1995; Kirsh & Maglio, 1996), extended (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), grounded 
(Barsalou, 2010), embodied (Glenberg, 2015; Wilson, 2002), enacted (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; 
Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991) and systemic (Vallée-Tourangeau & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2017). The 
theoretical notion behind these views posits that interacting with agents and objects fundamentally 
changes thinking in a way that is different from non-interactive performance. The approach to thinking 
and cognition from a distributed perspective has driven new areas of research in applicable areas such as 
mathematic education (Vallée-Tourangeau, 2013), problem solving (Guthrie, Vallée-Tourangeau, Vallée-
Tourangeau & Howard 2015), and forensic psychology (Baber, Smith, Cross, Hunter, & McMaster, 2006).  
 
An important point to address here is whether is it useful to think about these terms as being 
theoretically different from each other, or whether they should fall under the same category. Rowlands 
(2009) suggested that the Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH) has four components: that (i) information in 
the external world is relevant to cognitive processes, (ii) internal and external cues are (mostly) 
intertwined and are both recruited in mental processes, (iii) manipulation of the external information is 
related to real-world actions and is therefore ‘goal related’, and (iv) internal processes are (mostly) 
directly related to the use and manipulation of external information. The question here is whether or not 
these four elements are unique to the EMH. On the surface this appears to be a no; the similarities 
between these theories includes sharing the fundamental core of the distributed framework (i.e., that 
cognition is co-constituted with the body and the external environment in which it is embedded). 
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However, there are disparities between these views including the emphasis placed on the role of the 
sensori-motor network, their application to the study of both cognition and language, the extent to which 
the body and environment are partially or wholly integrated into the cognitive process, and even how 
these theories are defined among philosophers and cognitive scientists (Borghi, Scorolli, Caligiore, 
Baldassarre, & Tummolini, 2013; Kiverstein & Clark, 2009; Rowlands, 2009; Walter, 2010). Thompson and 
Stapleton (2009) discuss how enactivism centres on how elements of the environment are integrated 
into thinking processes as opposed to extended mind theories which provide an extension of thinking 
into the environment. Proponents of 3E and 4E Cognition suggest that the mind can be embodied, 
embedded, enactive (3E) and extended (4E), but do not equate these as identical processes (Fuchs, 2017; 
Gallagher, 2017; Menary, 2010). Instead, such views suggest that thinking is governed by the physical and 
sensori-motor system (embodied), is an emergent product from the interaction with the physical and 
social environment (embedded), reflects goal-directed actions (enacted) and is scaffolded by the 
cognitive properties of a system configured by an agent and resources outside the agent (extended).  
 
As noted, these different views on cognition all share the same fundamental premise. However, it does 
appear that the emphasis on the level of physical interactivity between an agent and an object is not 
consistent across these views. This potentially represents a significant divide across the viewpoints. 
Embodied Cognition suggests that “cognitive processes are constrained by our body” (Borghi et al., 2013, 
p. 1), therefore putting greater emphasis on the physical movements of the agent rather than on the 
environment. The notion of being embodied has been adopted in the study of concepts relating to the 
argument that concepts are not represented amodally, but are represented across areas of the sensori-
motor cortex (Barsalou, 2016; Borghi & Cimatti, 2010).  
 
In support of the argument that concepts are embodied, numerous studies have been cited where task 
performance is often facilitated (or even hindered) by the physical movements required of the 
participants (see Shipp, Vallée-Tourangeau & Anthony, 2018). Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) found that 
reaction times on sentence sensibility judgements were faster when participants indicated their answer 
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with an action that was congruent with the direction implied by the sentence. For example, participants 
were faster to respond ‘yes’ for sentences such as “Susan closed the drawer”, if to do so the action 
required a movement away from the body; in turn they were faster for sentences such as “Susan opened 
the drawer” if the action to indicate their answer required a movement toward the body. Similarly, a 
systemic perspective on cognition emphasises the physical interaction with the environment; the nature 
of this interaction guides and constrain how someone thinks. For example, participants are more 
successful on both insight and transformation problem solving tasks when they can interact with a 
physical model of the problem rather than mentally simulating solutions (Vallée-Tourangeau, Euden & 
Hearn, 2011; Weller, Villejoubert & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2011).  
 
The question becomes whether these terms describing cognition as being either distributed, extended, 
enacted, embodied, grounded or systemic, can (or even should) be integrated under one umbrella? The 
answer seems to be no. While these views converge on the notion that thinking cannot be cashed out in 
internal computational terms, what is constituted into cognitive processing and mental representations 
is, at present, debatable. A literature search for these terms on Scopus revealed that there are more 
published articles which use the terms embodied cognition than all the other terms combined. As this 
suggests the scientific community are in favour of describing cognition as being embodied, perhaps we 
should describe all distributed and systemic processes as being embodied? Again, the answer is a no. 
Embodied cognition is often used to describe the role of the body in relation to conceptual processing 
(Shipp et al., 2018), a definition which does not fit the other categories. However, the view of cognition 
being systemic could also be applied here; both terms examining what could be described as the online 
processing of physical objects. Therefore, labelling cognition as being either embodied or systemic 
automatically takes a more active viewpoint in comparison to describing cognition as being distributed, 
extended, enacted or grounded. With the absence of a physical component, it could be argued that such 
alternate terms simply view cognition as being contextually based (or even situated). This does not apply 
to the inclusion of physical components and hence embodied and systemic approaches must be 
considered more than just cognition in context.   
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